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Abstract 
 Hydrocarbons/oil is still the greatest source of energy in the world, 
although its importance is diminishing with the development of 
alternative/environment-friendly sources of energy such as wind-power and 
solar energy. For most oil-producing countries, hydrocarbons/oil revenue is a 
significant source of income. For instance, this is the case in Nigeria, whose 
economy depends heavily on oil revenue. Even so, natural resource wealth 
(hydrocarbons/oil, etc.)  can also be a curse as it may cause poverty in the 
country, breed corruption, precipitate human rights abuses and other 
contradictions. This is the experience of some oil-producing countries such as 
Nigeria, Libya, Ecuador, and Algeria. The recent discovery of hydrocarbons 
in Cyprus is surely an important development for the country. However, given 
the negative experience of other resource-rich countries it is important to 
explore the possible lessons Cyprus may learn from such experience that could 
help her maintain a healthy economy when hydrocarbons revenue starts rolling 
in as projected, in 2022. This is the main objective of this paper and the 
Nigerian experience will be used as a case-study. Presently, the Cyprus 
economy without hydrocarbons revenue is strong and healthy; income is 
derived from diverse sources such as tourism, services and agriculture. This 
paper argues that Cyprus should learn from the experience of Nigeria and 
avoid abandoning other sources of revenue when it starts earning 
hydrocarbons revenue so that it would not suffer ‘Dutch disease’. Moreover, 
from the experience of Nigeria, Cyprus should take precautionary steps to 
check hydrocarbons industry related corruption, internal conflicts and other 
paradox which hydrocarbons could bring about. In conclusion, the paper 
recommends that the Cyprus economy should remain diversified in order to 
avoid the negative experience of Nigeria.  
European Scientific Journal January 2018 edition Vol.14, No.1 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
76 
 
Keywords: Cyprus hydrocarbons, Nigerian oil economy, resource curse, 
rescission, diversified economy 
 
Introduction 
 Hydrocarbons/oil is still the greatest source of energy in the world, 
although its importance is diminishing with the development of 
alternative/environment-friendly sources of energy such as wind-power and 
solar energy. Importantly, most modern machineries, facilities and vehicles 
upon which development and human comfort heavily depend are powered by 
hydrocarbons or other by-products of petroleum. This underscores the 
domineering importance of hydrocarbons/oil in the world. For 
hydrocarbons/oil producing countries in particular, hydrocarbons/oil revenue 
is undoubtedly a veritable source of revenue to the national economy. On the 
contrary, hydrocarbons/oil can also become a curse or a paradox – for 
example, resulting in poverty, human rights abuses and conflicts. In fact, the 
struggle for the control of oil has caused internal conflicts, civil wars, 
international and proxy wars in some parts of the world. A good case in point 
is the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 which is widely regarded as a war to control 
the vast oil resources of the country (Bassil, 2012; Amin 2014).  
 It is well-known that Nigeria is Africa’s leading oil-producing and 
exporting country, and a key member of the Organization of Petroleum and 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Ebeku, 2006).1  It is also common knowledge 
that in 2011 hydrocarbons reserve - specifically natural gas - was discovered 
in commercial quantities in Cyprus, within her Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) (Lakes, 2012: 81). Surely, the announcement of that discovery by Noble 
Energy International Ltd (Noble Energy) of the USA was good news for 
Cyprus (Haynes, 2015). Indeed, it was a major development in the country, 
especially as it promises a new of source of mega income to the economy. 
                                                          
1 The Nigerian experience in oil exploitation shares a lot in common with other oil producing 
countries in the world, particularly oil producing less developed countries. However, for the 
purposes of this article it is sufficient to consider the Nigerian experience alone.  
*This paper was originally presented at a one-day Conference held in the University of 
Nicosia UNESCO Amphitheatre, Nicosia, Cyprus on Monday, December 5, 2016 on the 
theme Energy Developments and Lessons for Cyprus, organized by the Department of Law, 
University of Nicosia, Cyprus. I am grateful to Prof. Achilles Emilianides, Head of the School 
of Law, University of Nicosia, Cyprus and Dr Emilios Solomou, Vice-President 
(Administration), University of Nicosia, Cyprus, for inviting me to the conference and for 
facilitating my trip.  I am also grateful to Prof. Okey Onuchukwu, an economist with the 
University of Port Harcourt, for the insights he provided to me on Nigeria’s oil economy 
during our discussions in the course of writing the conference paper and for availing me some 
useful statistics. 
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 It is a notorious fact that the Nigerian economy runs on oil. However, 
there is no gain-saying that it is a sweet-sour experience. Hence, it is important 
to interrogate the Nigerian oil economy and explore the lessons for the 
Republic of Cyprus, as she looks forward to earning hydrocarbons revenue 
from about 2022. This is the central objective of this article.  
 The article is divided into several sections for ease of presentation. It 
commences in section I with examination of the nature of the Nigerian 
economy before the discovery and exploitation of oil. This is followed in 
section II by an elaboration of the place of oil in the Nigerian economy from 
1970 to 2017. Importantly, this section will make clear the huge contributions 
of oil to the Nigerian economy since 1970s. In section III, the article will 
analyse the problems associated with oil wealth in Nigeria and explain what 
lessons the Republic of Cyprus may derive from that. The last section of the 
article, section IV, will summarize the lessons for Cyprus and make 
appropriate recommendation(s).   
  
Nigerian economy before the discovery and exploitation of oil: a nutshell 
 Nigeria was a British creation through a piecemeal process that 
culminated in the amalgamation of the southern and northern part of the 
present-day country in 1914 (Hatch, 1971; Ebeku 2006: 14-18).  Before formal 
colonisation, Britain and other European powers were attracted to the area now 
constituting Nigeria by the prospect of trade (Niven, 1952: 136-142). In the 
words of a leading Nigerian historian, ‘commerce was the fundamental 
relationship that bound Africa to Europe’ (Dike, 1956: 1). In the main, the 
peoples of the area now called Nigeria traded their agricultural products with 
visiting European traders. As one author puts it, ‘during the colonial 
period…Nigeria was exploited for its agricultural products’ (Robinson, 1996: 
9).  
 The British colonial rule in Nigeria lasted from about 1861 to 1960 
when Nigeria was granted independence by the colonizers, after years of 
agitation by Nigerian nationalists. At independence in 1960 and up till the 
early 1970s the Nigerian economy was agrarian or ‘agro-based'. The major 
agricultural products were Cocoa (produced in the West), groundnut and 
cotton (produced in the North), and palm oil (produced in the East). To be 
sure, although oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 and oil exports reached 
5,100 barrels in 1958, oil revenue did not play a major role in the Nigerian 
economy until the early 1970s. From statistical records, ‘in the early 1960s, 
revenue from oil accounted for less than 10 per cent of Nigeria’s revenue base’ 
(Robinson, 1996: 9). More specifically, in 1963 and 1964 oil revenue was only 
4.1 per cent and 5.9 per cent, respectively of the total revenue of the country 
(Graf, 1988: 218; Robinson, 1996: 8).  
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 To sum up, before the oil boom of the 1970s the bulk of Nigeria’s 
revenue was from agriculture (Iwaloye and Ibeanu, 1997: 62-63). Notably, the 
Nigerian economy at that time was strong and healthy and its currency 
exchanged favourably as against the British Pounds Sterling and the US 
Dollars. Moreover, many citizens were gainfully employed in agriculture and 
the level of official corruption was low compared to the situation under the 
contemporary oil-economy. 
 
The place of oil in the nigerian economy: 1970s to 2017 
 International oil prices escalated in the early 1970s, resulting in what 
was popularly known in oil producing and exporting countries as ‘oil boom’. 
That development immediately led to a significant increase in the contribution 
of oil revenue to the Nigerian economy (Odularu, 2008). The following 
statistical records demonstrate this point:  
Table A: Contribution of oil to Nigerian Federal Government Revenue, 1970 - 1979 
Year Oil Revenue as % of Total Revenue 
1970 25.9% 
1971 52.5% 
1972 41.5% 
1973 67.3% 
1974 80.8% 
1975 78.7% 
1976 78.5% 
1977 70.6% 
1978 63.1% 
1979 81.4% 
Source: Graf (1988: 219); Ebeku (2006: 73). Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports, 1973-
79 
 
Table B: Contribution of Oil Revenue to Foreign Exchange Earnings 
Year Oil Revenue as % of Foreign Exchange 
1960s 2.5% 
1970 58.1 
1975 93.6 
1980s 98% + 
Source: Graf (1988: 219); Ebeku (2006: 73); Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports, 1973-
83 
 
 As can be seen from Table A, the contribution of oil revenue to the 
Federal Government revenue maintained a steady high from 1971 to 1979. 
Similarly, Table B shows that the contribution of oil revenue as a percentage 
of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings ‘escalated from 2.5 per cent of all such 
earnings in [1960s] to 93.6 per cent in 1975, and to 98 per cent and more 
through the first half of the 1980s’ (Graf, 1988: 219).  
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 More recent statistics showing the place of oil revenue in Nigeria’s 
economy can be found below in Table C, extracted from the Central Bank of 
Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2015: 
Table C: Contribution of oil to Nigerian Federal Government Revenue, 1980 - 2015 
Year 
Total 
Revenue 
Oil 
Revenue 
Non-Oil 
Revenue 
Real 
GDP 
Oil 
Revenu
e as 
%age 
of 
Total 
Revenu
e 
Non-
Oil 
Revenu
e as 
%age 
of 
Total 
Revenu
e 
Total 
Revenu
e as 
%age 
of Real 
GDP 
Oil 
Revenu
e as 
%age 
of Real 
GDP 
Non-
Oil 
Reve
nue 
as 
%ag
e of 
Real 
GDP 
1980 15.23 12.35 2.88 6501.83 81.09 18.91 0.23 0.19 0.04 
1981 13.29 8.56 4.73 15258.00 64.41 35.59 0.09 0.06 0.03 
1982 11.43 7.81 3.62 14985.08 68.33 31.67 0.08 0.05 0.02 
1983 10.51 7.25 3.26 13849.73 68.98 31.02 0.08 0.05 0.02 
1984 11.25 8.27 2.98 13779.26 73.51 26.49 0.08 0.06 0.02 
1985 15.05 10.92 4.13 14953.91 72.56 27.44 0.10 0.07 0.03 
1986 12.60 8.11 4.49 15237.99 64.37 35.63 0.08 0.05 0.03 
1987 25.38 19.03 6.35 15263.93 74.98 25.02 0.17 0.12 0.04 
1988 27.60 19.83 7.77 16215.37 71.85 28.15 0.17 0.12 0.05 
1989 53.87 39.13 14.74 17294.68 72.64 27.36 0.31 0.23 0.09 
1990 98.10 71.89 26.22 19305.63 73.28 26.73 0.51 0.37 0.14 
1991 100.99 82.67 18.33 19199.06 81.86 18.15 0.53 0.43 0.10 
1992 190.45 164.08 26.38 19620.19 86.15 13.85 0.97 0.84 0.13 
1993 192.77 162.10 30.67 19927.99 84.09 15.91 0.97 0.81 0.15 
1994 201.91 160.19 41.72 19979.12 79.34 20.66 1.01 0.80 0.21 
1995 459.99 324.55 135.44 20353.20 70.56 29.44 2.26 1.59 0.67 
1996 523.60 408.78 114.81 21177.92 78.07 21.93 2.47 1.93 0.54 
1997 582.81 416.81 166.00 21789.10 71.52 28.48 2.67 1.91 0.76 
1998 463.61 324.31 139.30 22332.87 69.95 30.05 2.08 1.45 0.62 
1999 949.19 724.42 224.77 22449.41 76.32 23.68 4.23 3.23 1.00 
2000 1906.16 1591.68 314.48 23688.28 83.50 16.50 8.05 6.72 1.33 
2001 2231.60 1707.56 903.46 25267.54 76.52 40.48 8.83 6.76 3.58 
2002 1731.84 1230.85 500.99 28957.71 71.07 28.93 5.98 4.25 1.73 
2003 2575.10 2074.28 500.82 31709.45 80.55 19.45 8.12 6.54 1.58 
2004 3920.50 3354.80 565.70 35020.55 85.57 14.43 11.19 9.58 1.62 
2005 5547.50 4762.40 785.10 37474.95 85.85 14.15 14.80 12.71 2.09 
2006 5965.10 5287.57 677.54 39995.50 88.64 11.36 14.91 13.22 1.69 
2007 5727.50 4462.91 1264.60 42922.41 77.92 22.08 13.34 10.40 2.95 
2008 7866.59 6530.60 1336.00 46012.52 83.02 16.98 17.10 14.19 2.90 
2009 4844.59 3191.94 1652.65 49856.10 65.89 34.11 9.72 6.40 3.31 
2010 7303.67 5396.09 1907.58 54612.26 73.88 26.12 13.37 9.88 3.49 
2011 11116.90 8878.97 2237.88 57511.04 79.87 20.13 19.33 15.44 3.89 
2012 10654.75 8025.97 2628.78 59929.89 75.33 24.67 17.78 13.39 4.39 
2013 9759.79 6809.23 2950.56 63218.72 69.77 30.23 15.44 10.77 4.67 
2014 10068.85 6793.82 3275.03 67152.79 67.47 32.53 14.99 10.12 4.88 
2015 6912.50 3830.10 3082.41 69023.93 55.41 44.59 10.01 5.55 4.47 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2015 
         
 From Table C above, the position of oil as the dominant source of 
revenue in Nigeria from 1980 to as recently as 2015 cannot be in doubt. As 
could be observed, this is consistent with the position earlier noted in the 
1970s. In its 1981 Annual Report, the Central Bank of Nigeria summed up the 
significant contribution of oil to the Nigerian economy as follows: ‘Oil which 
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was first discovered in 1956 and first exported in 1958 accounted for more 
than 90% of Nigerian exports by value and about 80% of government revenue 
as at December 31, 1981…. [T]he overall contribution of the oil sector to the 
national economy also grew from an insignificant 0.1% in 1959 to 87% in 
1976.’ The 2003 budget speech of President Obasanjo further underscores this 
point: ‘Oil will continue to be the major source of government revenue in the 
near term’. Even researchers have found that oil is the backbone of Nigeria’s 
economy, as the following statement illustrates: 
The Nigerian government… earned Naira 209.2 billion (Euro 1.3 
billion) in excess [oil] revenue between January and May 2004… 
Nigeria’s Central Bank further announced that the country’s 
economy had grown at a record rate of 10.2 per cent in 2003. 
Growth is mostly driven by the oil sector and record oil prices are 
producing more excess revenues… The Bank Governor was also 
optimistic about further strong growth in 2004 (emphasis added) 
(Afrol News, 2004). 
 
Problems of nigeria’s oil-based economy and lessons for cyprus 
 There is no doubt that for over 50 years Nigerian oil revenue (derived 
mainly from sale of crude oil, royalties and taxation of oil companies) has 
helped to fund rapid infrastructural developments in many Nigerian cities. For 
example, Lagos (Nigeria’s former federal capital city) as well as the present 
federal capital city, Abuja, was constructed with ‘petrodollars’. In fact, all 
major infrastructure/institutions – e.g. roads, bridges, schools, and universities 
– have been financed by oil revenue. Moreover, in 2014 oil revenue helped 
Nigeria to leap to the position of largest economy in Africa, overtaking South 
Africa. All this and more may be regarded as the benefits of Nigeria’s oil 
wealth.  
  Never-the-less, there are still a lot of problems associated with the 
discovery and exploitation of oil in Nigeria. In other words, oil has not brought 
only blessings to Nigeria; it has also occasioned woes. In fact, Nigeria’s over-
dependence on oil revenue is ill-advised, having regards to the problems 
associated with oil wealth as explicated below.  
 As at the time of writing in 2017, Cyprus economy was strong and 
healthy, based mainly on tourism, services and agriculture. As could be noted, 
this is similar to the position in Nigeria before the oil boom of the 1970s. As 
Cyprus looks forward to hydrocarbons/oil revenue from around 2022, it is 
important to explore the experience of Nigeria and extract some lessons that 
could help to maintain the country as a viable and heathy economy.  For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to analyse  some of the problems associated 
with oil wealth in Nigeria which hold some lessons for Cyprus – namely, oil 
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curse, the ‘Dutch disease’, instability of international oil prices, conflicts, 
corruption, etc. These will be discussed in turn. 
(a) OIL CURSE  
 In spite of the wealth and infrastructural developments that oil 
revenues have brought to Nigeria, it is a contradiction to note that the people 
of the country are still among the poorest peoples in the world. As one observer 
puts it, ‘in spite of oil revenues estimated at some $350 billion over three 
decades, it seems that the average Nigerian was actually worse off in relative 
terms’ (Belinksi, 2015). In fact, statistical records show that over 60% of 
Nigerians live on less than USD2 per day (Essia, 2012).   
 This situation is even more acute in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria 
from where the country derives enormous oil revenues (Essia, 2012). In a 
recent article, Osaghae (2015) explored the developmental outcome of 
resource abundance ‘when the analytical focus shifts from the macro 
(national) to the micro (subnational) level, especially to areas where resource 
abundance is expected to have its greatest impact’. He found that in the Niger 
Delta region the resource curse includes ‘environmental devastation, relative 
deprivation, resource distribution injustices, political marginalization and 
material underdevelopment’. He blames the subnational governments 
especially for this situation (See also Baghebo and Atima, 2013: 104-5). But, 
in my judgment, the major blame should rest on the national government 
which owns all the natural resources in the country, including oil, by virtue of 
constitutional and statutory provisions (Ebeku, 2006).   
 More importantly, the widespread poverty in oil-rich Nigeria is a 
classic example of ‘oil curse’. The theory of ‘oil curse’ (also known as 
‘resource curse’ or the ‘paradox of plenty’) essentially states that countries 
with abundant natural resources, such as oil or other minerals, tend to have 
less economic growth, more conflict or war, and high-level of individual 
poverty compared to countries with fewer natural resources (Wenar, 2016: xv; 
Ross, 2004; Ross, 2004a; Hausmann and Rigobon, 2002). As Basedau and Lay 
(2009) have noted: 
The growing literature on the ‘resource curse’ (Sachs & Warner, 
1995; Auty, 2001) and the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Karl, 1997) has 
been linking the extraction of natural resources to corruption, 
authoritarianism, economic decline and civil war. In the study of 
peace and war, natural resources are said to provide both finance 
and motive for armed conflict and to create indirect economic and 
institutional causes of violence (Ross, 2006; Humphreys, 2005; 
Fearon, 2005). Numerous empirical studies have provided 
evidence that natural-resource dependent and rich countries 
indeed seem to be more likely to lapse into violence… 
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 In a recently published book entitled Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence and 
the Rules That Run the World, Leif Wenar (2016: xv) reported his findings 
thus: 
For forty years, oil states have been noisy distractions to the quiet 
successes of the developing world. While non-oil states have 
generally been getting richer, freer, and more peaceful, the oil 
states are no richer, no more free, and no more peaceful than they 
were in 1980. Many oil states have even gotten worse – Gabon’s 
average income fell by almost half over the quarter century from 
1980; Iraq’s fell by a full 85 percent. Long internal conflicts have 
ravaged countries like Algeria, Angola, Columbia, and 
Nigeria…These figures show what political scientists call the 
‘’resource curse’’. 
 Although the theory of ‘resource curse’ has been doubted and 
criticized by some authors (e.g. Basedau and Lay, 2009), there are 
undisputable examples of oil-rich countries, such as Nigeria and the Sudan, 
where the citizens are among the poorest people in the world (Ebeku, 2006: 
282-291; Rolandsen, 2012). The reason for this includes corruption, 
concentration of funds in the hands of a few, mismanagement of oil revenues 
by successive governments and lack of good governance. For Cyprus, the 
lesson to learn here is that while hydrocarbons could provide mega revenues 
for the economy, it may also be a curse as the experience of Nigeria and many 
other resource-rich countries has shown. To avoid this, Cyprus must take 
institutional and other measures to check the factors that brought about ‘oil 
curse’ in Nigeria and elsewhere, as mentioned above. Some resource-rich 
countries, such as the US and the UK, have eventually managed to avoid the 
paradox of plenty.  
 
(b) THE DUTCH DISEASE SYNDROME 
 It is well-known that since the 1970s when Nigeria began earning 
increasing income from the export of crude oil, other sectors of the economy 
– particularly agriculture and manufacturing - have been neglected (Ebeku, 
2006: 72). This situation illustrates what economists call the ‘Dutch disease’ 
syndrome. In development economics literature, ‘Dutch disease’ essentially 
means the impediments of oil revenue to economic growth and development 
of oil-dependent states (Otawa, 2001:111). As Otaha (2012: 83-84) explains: 
The enormous influx of cash resulting from oil tends to foster 
wasteful, overzealous and imprudent expenditure. High oil 
revenue raises exchange rates, promote [sic] adverse balance of 
payment as the cost of imports rises. In short, it kills incentive to 
risk investment in non-oil sectors, the competitiveness of all non-
oil sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing industries have 
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been crowded out. The employment of both labour and other 
resources has been exchanged for unemployment as the 
government and private expenditure multipliers have been 
exported abroad. Together, these forces constitute what Michael 
Ross (2001:114) calls the rentier effect, oil states being rentier 
states. 
 Belinksi (2015) has admirably described the debilitating effect of 
‘Dutch disease’ on an economy and the people affected, and suggested that 
the disease is better prevented than cured. Using Nigeria as a case-study, he 
explained how ‘Dutch disease’ and falling international oil prices combined 
to lead Nigeria into recession in 2016. In summary, he stated the painful effects 
of ‘Dutch disease’ in the following words:  
Time again, studies have confirmed that resource-poor countries 
outperform commodity exporters in terms of economic growth by 
a considerable margin. What’s more, developing countries 
stricken with the Dutch disease tend to perform worse than their 
non-exporting counterparts in rule of law, income distribution and 
overall good governance. Populations concentrated around 
resource-rich areas develop rent-seeking behavior … Oxford 
University Professor Paul Collier even argues that oil rich 
countries have higher chances of being engulfed in wars than their 
resource poor counterparts. 
 With specific regard to the experience of Nigeria, he blames wrong 
policy choices of successive governments for the country’s economic woes. 
In his words: ‘Nigeria, which clocks in at 2 million barrels a day and is 
Africa’s largest exporter, clearly displays the damaging effects policy myopia 
can have on a resource rich country’ (Belinksi, 2015). He was right. Nigeria 
abandoned agriculture and other sources of revenue pre-oil wealth revenue. 
This resulted in a mono-product economy with all the associated risks. 
Besides, Nigeria also exemplifies lawlessness, bad governance, and inequity 
in income distribution (Ebeku, 2006). 
 Having analysed the Nigerian case of ‘Dutch disease’, Belinksi (2015) 
concluded that ‘the case for Nigeria to move away from its reliance on oil is 
quite compelling, as the country is almost a textbook case of the Dutch 
disease…’ According to him, ‘[over] dependence on natural resources makes 
the economy vulnerable to commodity prices’ (Belinksi, 2015). Undoubtedly, 
Nigeria over depends on oil revenue and lacks product diversity. In other 
words, the Nigerian economy relies only on the export of a primary 
commodity - namely, oil. This situation predisposes it to recession when 
international oil prices fall. Interestingly, this was also the experience of the 
US in Post-Second World War. As Mathew has rightly noted, a sharp decline 
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in oil prices ‘have been identified as a major cause in seven out of eight post 
WW II recessions in the US’ (Mathew, undated). 
 Obviously, there is a lesson here that Cyprus should learn from the 
outset in order to avoid the experience of Nigeria – viz: avoid over-dependence 
on income from any natural resource in the country; maintain a diversified 
economy. Presently, Nigeria seems to have understood the need to move away 
from over-dependence on oil revenue as she is striving to revive and promote 
the agricultural sector. In fact, from about September 2017 some Nigerian 
agricultural products are being exported to other African countries, Europe 
and America. By this development, Nigeria is beginning to return to its 
original sources of wealth. 
  
(c) INSTABILITY OR UNCERATINTY OF INTERNATIONAL OIL 
PRICES 
 There is no gain-saying that international oil prices are notoriously 
unstable or uncertain. The instability/uncertainty of international oil prices is 
another important reason why resource-rich countries should ensure that they 
maintain real diversified economy and avoid over-dependence on natural 
resource revenues. The experience of Nigeria and other oil-rich countries 
which overly depend on oil revenues has shown that over-dependence on 
revenues from natural resources is not only foolish but also a recipe for 
economic troubles in times of low international oil prices, as happens from 
time to time. A recent example can be found in Nigeria. With decreasing 
international oil prices since 2014, the Nigerian oil economy was hard hit and 
slipped into recession in 2016. In other words, low international oil prices 
caused external shock on the economy.  
 Related to the foregoing, another cause of the recent recession was the 
failure of Nigeria’s oil wealth to add value to the economy as a result of certain 
practices and policies (Baghebo and Atima, 2013: 105). For example, crude 
oil is exported and refined products are imported for domestic needs. The 
problem in this situation lies in the fact that much of the ‘petrodollars’ earned 
by Nigeria is virtually ‘recycled’ to importing countries when she imports 
refined oil products and other commodities from crude oil importing countries. 
Mathew makes this point well when he said: 
… [O]il revenues earned by producers are to a large extent 
‘‘recycled’’ back to consumers in imports of all types of goods and 
services.  In this way, oil-importing nations earn back much of the 
petrodollars they originally spend on oil purchases... (Mathew, 
undated). 
 Now, the lesson for Cyprus here is that international oil/hydrocarbons 
prices are unstable or uncertain and a fall in prices could introduce external 
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shock on the economy.  To check this likelihood Cyprus must ensure that its 
economy remains diversified even with the coming of oil revenues.  
 
(d) CONFLICT, OIL PRODUCTION AND THE ECONOMY 
 There is hardly any country in the world without one form of conflict 
or the other. However, this is more so in the case of resource-rich countries. 
In fact, it has been found that oil-rich countries are prone to conflicts (Collier, 
2010). Nigeria and the Sudan illustrate this point (Belinksi, 2015; Rolandsen, 
2012). Between 1967 and 1970 Nigeria was embroiled in a civil war, widely 
regarded as a struggle for the control of the oil endowments in the then Eastern 
Region of the country. In the case of the Sudans (Sudan and Southern Sudan), 
it was also the case that distribution of oil revenue caused and fuelled the civil 
war in the country and led to the eventual breakup of the country. The point to 
make here is that during wars or conflicts oil production activities are slowed 
and oil facilities may be attacked. The natural result of such eventuality is a 
cut in oil production and the consequent effect of drop in oil revenues. This 
was the experience of Nigeria and the Sudan during their civil wars and during 
heightened conflicts.    
 Over the past 50 years of oil production, particularly since the 1990s, 
Nigeria experiences low oil production from time to time as a result of conflict 
situations in the oil-producing region. From time to time, militant youths in 
the Niger Delta region agitating for greater participation in oil exploitation and 
equitable sharing of oil revenue disrupt oil production by damaging oil 
production pipelines and/or blowing-up oil facilities. This situation often 
introduce internal shock on the economy, which could lead to rescission, 
particularly if this combines with external shock due to low international oil 
prices.  
 The likelihood of disruption of hydrocarbons production facilities by 
militants should be a serious concern for Cyprus because of the long-standing 
hostilities between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since 1974, the country 
has been divided between the Greek Cypriots in the south and the Turkish 
Cypriots in the north – a situation created, encouraged and sustained by the 
Republic of Turkey on the ground of protecting the Turkish Cypriots.  
 Already, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots (occupying the unrecognized 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north of Cyprus) have threatened 
to disrupt hydrocarbons/oil exploration in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) of Cyprus (Energy Boardroom 2015: 21).  The fact that they have not 
carried out the threat does not indicate that they would not seek to disrupt 
hydrocarbons/oil production in the future. Although the President of Cyprus 
has declared that hydrocarbons/oil revenues would be shared by both the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, there remains a possibility that the question 
of equitable distribution or fair sharing formula may well arise in the future –  
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especially if the separation between the two communities endures. In that case, 
the country could face militant attacks on hydrocarbon facilities and cut in 
resource production as often happens in Nigeria.  
 In fact, the basis for disagreement already exists. Some Greek Cypriots 
disagree with the position of the President of the Republic on sharing 
hydrocarbons revenue and this may become a political/electoral issue as long 
as the ‘Cyprus problem’ – an expression used to describe the separation of the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the occupation of Northern Cyprus by the 
Turkish military since 1974 – remains unresolved.  
 
(e) CORRUPTION  
 One of the critical problems that beset oil-producing and exporting 
countries, especially in less developed countries, is mammoth corruption by 
state officials and the personnel of state oil-related institutions. In Nigeria, one 
of such oil-related institutions is the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC). Similar institution exists in Cyprus and is called Cyprus 
Hydrocarbons Company (CHC). The sad reality is that much of Nigeria’s oil 
revenue disappears into the private pockets/offshore accounts of corrupt 
officials of the oil-related institutions and some privileged government 
officers in charge of such institutions as well as some privileged elites 
(Baghebo and Atima, 2013: 112). In fact, corrupt practices bring about a 
situation where Nigeria does not know the accurate volume of daily oil 
production, notwithstanding the existence of the Nigerian Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) whose vision is to have a country 
‘whose extractive sector is transparent, accountable, and beneficial to all 
Nigerians’.2 
 In the 1990s, successive military governments stashed away millions 
of ‘petrodollars’ in private accounts in Europe, America and other parts of the 
world. This is a notorious fact. Also well-known is that some Nigerian officials 
have been convicted and some are wanted or are standing trials in various 
countries on charges related to corruption and money laundering.3 One of the 
most recent examples is Nigeria’s former petroleum Minister Mrs. Diezani 
Alison-Madueke whose trial on charges of corruption in a British court in 
London was still pending as at, November 2017. The notoriety and extent of 
corruption in Nigeria probably led Nigeria’s President Buhari to admit to the 
suggestion of British Prime Minister David Cameron that Nigeria is 
‘fantastically corrupt’. 
                                                          
2 The Mission of NEITI is ‘to institutionalise accountability mechanisms and processes aimed 
at instilling a culture of transparency in Nigeria’s extractive sector for the benefit of all’.  
3 Some of the countries listed as holding such corrupt money include Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, the US, St. Vincent, Malta, and Cyprus.  
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 In light of the forgoing Nigerian experience, Cyprus must brace up to the 
fact that hydrocarbons revenue may breed corruption in the country and must 
begin now to plan how to checkmate the evil. Nigeria has two anti-corruption 
agencies, namely, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 
and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), which are 
designed to checkmate corruption in the country. However, both of them are 
ineffective due mainly to the fact that they are virtually controlled by the 
Office of the President and are largely used to chastise political opponents. 
Leaning from the Nigerian experience, Cyprus must allow any established 
anti-corruption agency to be truly independent and effective and not an 
appendage to any office of government. Importantly, this will not only help to 
curb the incidence of corruption, but will also help to control inflation and 
stabilise the economy for the general good of the people.    
 
(f) ENVIRONMNETAL PROBLEMS  
 It is platitudinous to say that exploitation of natural resources naturally 
involves environmental pollution. This is why measures to ensure sustainable 
development are important. In general, the environment is our natural abode, 
and consists of air, water and land. Although there are so many definitions of 
environmental pollution/pollution, for present purposes it is sufficient to rely 
on the definition of the Council of the European Union in the Directive 
Concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 1996, where 
‘pollution’ is defined as follows: 
The direct or indirect introduction as a result of human activity, of 
substances, vibrations, heat or noise into the air, water or land 
which may be harmful to health or the quality of the environment, 
result in damage to material, property, or impair or interfere with 
amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment (E.C. 
Council Directive 96/61, 24 September 1996). 
 The environment provides the resource base for extraction of natural 
resources and the process of exploration, exploitation, production and 
transportation can have far-reaching impacts on the environment 
(Puvimanasinghe, 2000: 38). In other words, as O’Faaircheallaigh (1991: 251) 
has rightly pointed out, ‘modern mining projects have the potential to create 
enormous environmental damage’. Young (1995: 157) categorically makes 
the point that ‘environmentally, modern mining operations have been 
destructive. The removal of a non-renewable resource [such as oil or 
hydrocarbons] usually causes some environmental damage’. Hence, Josephs 
(1967) was right to conclude that ‘the threats of pollution are real. Their 
economic [environmental, social and cultural] consequences are real. Their 
health consequences are real. There are sufficient data to make strong cases 
based on facts’ (Quoted in Ebeku, 2006: 135). 
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 In Nigeria, environmental pollution is a blight on the Nigerian oil 
industry. Frequent oil spillages and intensive gas flaring have devastated the 
environment in great measure and caused incalculable environmental, socio-
economic and cultural damage (Ebeku, 2006: Chapter 4). Despite denials by 
oil multinationals operating in the country, there is no doubt that the Nigerian 
environment – specifically, the Niger Delta area where oil operations are 
taking place – has been devastated in the course of over 50 years of oil 
exploration and exploitation in Nigeria. The report of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) on Ogoni-land published on August 4, 
2011, eloquently attests to this (UNEP, 2011). Sadly, this is the case in spite 
of the fact that Nigeria has a satisfactory body of laws on environmental 
protection. The truth is that, because of the importance of oil to the Nigerian 
economy successive governments and relevant government agencies do not 
enforce the extant laws even where oil operations manifestly violate relevant 
environment protection laws. 
 In accordance with international industry best practices and in 
compliance to Cypriot law and EU regulations, Noble Energy has already 
conducted ‘Environmental Impact Assessment for Exploratory Drilling of 
Block 12, Offshore Cyprus’, and this was published in September 2011. 
Despite the shortcomings and questionable conclusions of the report, it is 
important to note the acknowledgment of potential environmental damage in 
the course of hydrocarbons operations:  
The probability of a significant hydrocarbon release during the 
project is very small, especially since gas is the target 
hydrocarbon. An accidental release of diesel fuel, e.g. from the 
rupture of the fuel tank on the drilling vessel or a release during 
the fuelling operations offshore, is more likely than a crude 
hydrocarbon release … If a large diesel release did occur, it could 
affect marine life, such as plankton, fishes, marine mammals, sea 
turtles and birds, and possibly affect socioeconomic resources. If 
the hydrocarbon reached the shoreline, it could affect coastal 
habitats, including beaches and seagrass beds, rocky shores and 
associated wildlife... (emphasis added). 
 This frank acknowledgment puts Cyprus on notice that hydrocarbons 
exploration and exploitation (more so where oil is the target hydrocarbon) 
could bring much money, but could also cause much environmental problems 
that may inevitably damage the economy. The UNEP Report on Ogoni reveals 
mammoth environmental damage with reverberating consequences on the 
people and the economy, and this was due partly to the refusal of Nigerian 
administrative and judicial authorities to enforce relevant oil-related 
environmental protection laws in deference to the importance of oil revenue 
to the Nigerian economy (UNEP, 2011).  
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 As is the case in Nigeria, Cyprus has a body of domestic laws 
(harmonised with relevant EU laws/regulations on environment) that could 
protect the Cypriot environment from hydrocarbon-related pollution. Even so, 
she should learn from the Nigerian experience that privileging hydrocarbons 
revenue over enforcement of extant laws and/or not making necessary 
environmental protection laws could spell doom on the Cyprus economy. 
 
(g) MANAGEMENT AND SHARING OF OIL REVENUE 
 The management and sharing of oi/hydrocarbons revenue is of crucial 
importance because any disagreement could be the source of conflict, which 
could hurt hydrocarbons/oil production and destabilise the economy. In 
Nigeria, the sharing of oil revenue has been a source of long-standing disputes 
and this has adverse effects on the economy. The central complaint of agitators 
for equity is that the management of oil revenue is firmly in the hands of the 
majority ethnic groups in the country who have no oil in their homeland, and 
that the people of the minority ethnic groups where the oil operations take 
place are not allowed to participate in the oil industry. Moreover, they 
complain that distribution of oil revenue is inequitable in the sense that while 
oil exploitation takes place in the homeland of minority ethnic groups in the 
Niger Delta region and the people suffer adverse environmental, socio-
economic and cultural costs, oil revenue is mainly used to develop the 
homeland of the majority ethnic groups and benefit their people (Ebeku, 2006: 
Chapter 6). 
 Over the years, it has not been possible to find an acceptable revenue 
sharing formula in Nigeria, particularly with regard to the sharing of oil 
revenue (Ebeku, 2006: 291-300). The proviso to section 162(2) of the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria entrenches ‘the principle of derivation in any formula 
the National Assembly may come up with’. More importantly, ‘by this 
principle ‘‘not less than thirteen per cent’’ of the revenue accruing to the 
Federation Account directly from any natural resource shall be payable to a 
State of the Federation from which such natural resources are derived’ 
(Attorney of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Ors. (No. 
2) [2002] 6 NWLR (Pt. 764) 542). The proviso has been implemented since 
the year 2000. However, the Niger Delta people want it to be increased to at 
least 50% while some people of the other States outside the Niger Delta want 
it reduced to 10 % or below.  
 In the Republic of Cyprus, populated by two main ethnic and 
antagonistic communities (Greek and Turkish Cypriots), which have been 
living in separation since 1974, the management and distribution of 
hydrocarbons/oil wealth may well be controversial as is the case in Nigeria. 
At the time of writing this article in 2017, there was ongoing debate in the 
country on the issue. In fact, this was one of the issues debated at a one-day 
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conference held on November 26, 2011 in the Nicosia Buffer Zone on the 
theme ‘Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons: Wealth Distribution and Regional 
Politics’ (Faustmann, Gurel and Reichberg 2012: 6).4 An indication of the 
controversial nature of this issue can be found in the contribution of Leventis 
(2012: 10) at the conference: 
… we equally witness an all too compromising stance of the 
Cyprus government: the Christofias administration, despite the 
internal opposition criticism that he comes up with premature 
offers to the Turkish side, has pledged that any prospective 
proceeds out of the natural resources exploitation are guaranteed 
to be used for the interests of both Cypriot communities – a 
promise, it should be noted, that comes on top of a raft of post-
2004 measures in favour of the Turkish Cypriot community. 
 This controversial position can also be found in an interview granted 
in 2011 by Michalis Sarris, former Finance Minister of the Republic of Cyprus 
and Member of the Working Group on Economic Matters in the Cyprus 
reunification talks. His words: 
… I think we need to be honest about this. The Turkish Cypriot 
side … has always insisted on separate institutions. The only time 
that they talk about doing something together is when they talk 
about the redistribution of taxes raised on the Greek side, and 
when we talk about the gas. So, one has to be consistent: do you 
want to be together, or do you want to be separate except when it 
comes to revenue transfer from one side to the other? (Hazou, 
2012: 90). 
 Learning from the Nigerian experience, Cyprus needs to handle the 
issue of management and distribution of hydrocarbons revenue from the outset 
in a manner that will be fair to both communities. Importantly, both sides must 
not insist on fixed positions.  
 
Conclusion 
 This article has amply demonstrated that the Nigerian oil-based 
economy is a mixed bag of blessings and curse. In fact, it may well be more 
of curse than blessings considering the problems associated with oil wealth as 
discussed in this article. Specifically, some problems associated with the 
exploitation of oil and over-dependence on oil revenue in Nigeria were 
identified and analysed and the lessons for Cyprus clearly pointed out.  
 More specifically, this article shows that Cyprus should learn from 
Nigeria, among others, that hydrocarbons/oil wealth may become a curse – 
                                                          
4 The conference was jointly organised by Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Cyprus Centre. 
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resulting in poverty and human rights abuses, for example – except proper 
precautions are taken. A second lesson is that hydrocarbons/oil may lead the 
country to ‘Dutch disease’ if other sectors of the economy are abandoned as a 
result of ‘oil-boom’. Thirdly, hydrocarbons/oil may breed corruption in 
Cyprus except conscious efforts are made to check this likelihood. Fourthly, 
hydrocarbons/oil may generate or exacerbate internal conflict which could 
cause low production and thereby introduce internal shock on the economy as 
a result of reduced revenue. Fifthly, there could also be external shock on the 
economy as a result of low international hydrocarbons/oil prices which 
prevails from time to time. Sixthly, the management and distribution of 
hydrocarbons/oil revenue may raise problems of fairness or equity which 
could ultimately affect the economy, except it is well managed. Lastly, 
hydrocarbons/oil exploitation may result in serious environmental damage 
unless appropriate environment protection laws are in place and are effectively 
enforced. 
 On the whole, the central message is that Cyprus should not be starry-
eyed about the discovery of hydrocarbons within its EEZ and the prospect of 
future discoveries, exploitation and hydrocarbons/oil mega revenue. 
Indisputably, the discovery of hydrocarbons in Cyprus is a welcome 
development but it did not and should not signal the end of hard work in the 
country. The existing Cyprus diversified economy – i.e. an economy whose 
revenue derives from different sources, including tourism, services and 
agriculture –  is strong and healthy and should be maintained. Importantly, the 
country must not make the mistake of Nigeria and suffer ‘Dutch disease’ by 
abandoning other sources of revenue when hydrocarbons/oil revenue start 
entering the economy. A diversified economy is the only sure way to 
sustainable prosperity. In summary, the problems associated with the Nigerian 
oil wealth as discussed in this article clearly hold useful lessons for Cyprus, 
and eloquently make a case for a diversified and sustainable economy. 
 Another reason why Cyprus should ensure that its economy remains 
diversified lies in the fact that the importance of oil in the world is diminishing 
as alternative sources of energy are being developed and concern for the 
environment continues to increase and compel the use of 
alternative/renewable energy which cause less damage to the environment 
(Helm, 2016). In fact, it is now the case that electric-powered cars are 
increasingly being manufactured to replace petrol or diesel engine cars. As it 
is well-known, carbons produced by the burning of petroleum products, such 
as premium motor spirits (PMS) or diesel in vehicles, contribute greatly to 
global warming and climate change which are arguably the greatest 
environmental concerns of mankind in the present-day. More importantly, in 
view of the diminishing importance of non-renewable energy, the likelihood 
is that Cyprus hydrocarbons/oil revenue – expected from 2022 – may not be 
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as great as the present case in Nigeria as well as in the other existing oil 
producing and exporting countries.  
 In the end, a fitting summary of the message conveyed by this article 
can be found in the following well-crafted and evergreen words of Kapucinski 
(1982: 34-35):5 
Oil [hydrocarbons] kindles extraordinary emotions and hopes, 
since oil is above all a great temptation. It is temptation of ease, 
wealth, fortune, power. [But] oil, though powerful, has its 
defects…Oil is a resource that anesthetizes thought, blurs vision, 
corrupts…Look at the Ministers from oil countries… [Above all] 
…oil creates the illusion of a completely changed life, life without 
work, life for free…. The concept of oil expresses perfectly the 
eternal human dream of wealth achieved through lucky 
accident…. In this sense oil is a fairy tale and like every fairy tale 
a bit of a lie. 
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